

that the good in general is an acceptable measure for everything that transpires in the experimental world.

The remaining fragments which have been attributed to the *Politicus*<sup>38</sup>) really are of small interest to us in that they contribute little if anything to our understanding of this early dialogue. As a matter of fact, some scholars have raised serious doubts as to whether they are in any way related to the *Politicus*<sup>39</sup>).

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## EMENDATIONS IN THE TEXT OF MAXIMUS OF TYRE

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This paper consists of eleven textual notes on Maximus of Tyre, the eclectic Platonic philosopher and rhetorician of the second century of our era. For the reader's convenience, in citing the text I shall refer by page and line to Hobein's<sup>1</sup>) critical edition of Maximus. The textual notes of Davis, Markland, and Reiske are taken from the second edition of Davis<sup>2</sup>) in Leipzig. A list of publications containing the emendations of scholars mentioned in this paper will be found in the *praeformatio* to Hobein's edition, pp. XVII-XX.

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38) Seneca, *De Ira* I. 3. 3, and *ibid.* at I. 7. 1; I. 9. 2; I. 17. 1; III. 3. 1; Cicero, *Tuscul. Disput.* IV, 19. 43; Philodemus, *De Ira*, pp. 65, line 31 - p. 66, line 2 (ed. Wilke); Rose, frag. 80; Ross, frag. 3. See also Philodemus, *De Rhetorica: Volumina Rhetorica*, vol. II (ed. S. Sudhaus, 1896), p. 175.

39) None of the fragments cited in note 38, *supra*, specifically refers to the *Politicus*. Fragment 81 (Rose), which V. Rose attributes to the *Politicus*, is now attributed to the Aristotelian *On Poets* by W. D. Ross: Ross, frag. 5 (*On Poets*).

1) H. Hobein, *Maximus Tyrius, Philosophumena, Lipsiae, in aed. Teubneri*, 1910.

2) *Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes, ex recensione Ioannis Davisii ... editio altera ... emendata notisque locupletioribus aucta. Cui accesserunt Ier. Marklandi annotationes. Excudi curavit et annotatiunculas de suo addidit Io. Iacobus Reiske, pars prima, secunda, Lipsiae, Th. Georgius, 1774-1775.*

In most of the textual notes no stemmatic evaluation is necessary, since they refer to a text shared by all codices. In the few instances where differences occur preference must be given to the codex *Graecus Parisinus 1962*, by far our best, which in Hobein's edition bears the sigillum R. This codex belongs to the 10th century<sup>3)</sup> and its significance was well recognized by so early a scholar as Duebner. Hobein based his edition almost exclusively on R, although he did not claim it to be the archetype of the existing codices<sup>4)</sup>. Soon after him Mutschmann<sup>5)</sup> and Schulte<sup>6)</sup> argued that R was the archetype of all our codices but without definite proof.

p. 139, 10–18: *Εἰ δὲ βούλει, τῆδε εἰκαζέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· τὸν μὲν θεῖον νοῦν τῷ ὄρᾶν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον τῷ λέγειν· ὀφθαλμοῦ μὲν γὰρ βολὴ δξύτατον, ἀθρόως σπῶσα τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ ὄρωμένου· λόγου δὲ ἐνέργεια ἔοικεν σχολαίῳ βάδισματι. Μᾶλλον δὲ ταύτη εἰκαζέσθω· ὁ μὲν θεῖος νοῦς κατὰ τὴν περιβολὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πάντα ἐφορᾷ τὸν ἐν γῆ τόπον ἀθρόως, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος κατὰ τὴν πορείαν αὐτοῦ, ἄλλοτε ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιπορευομένον. Two of our codd., R and B, give περιβολὴν τοῦ ἡλίου, the rest (followed by Heinse, Davis, Dukas, and Duebner) παραβολὴν τοῦ ἡλίου.*

Here Maximus provides two analogies of the relationship between the *θεῖος νοῦς* and the *ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς*. The first analogy is the relationship between *ὄρᾶν* and *λέγειν*. We see in a fraction of a second, but we need time to describe things. Thus the *θεῖος νοῦς* is *rapid*, whereas the *ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς* is *slow*. In the second analogy the *θεῖος νοῦς* is likened to the *περιβολή* (or *παραβολή*) τοῦ ἡλίου, whatever this may mean, and the *ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς* to the *πορεία ἡλίου*. We understand the meaning of the *πορεία ἡλίου* since it corresponds to the *σχολαῖον βάδισμα* (line 14) of the first example. The *ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς* moves *slowly* exactly as the sun does in its daily *πορεία* from east to west. The question is the meaning of *περιβολή* (or *παραβολή*) τοῦ ἡλίου. Line 16, *ἐφορᾷ τὸν ἐν γῆ τόπον ἀθρόως*, leads back to *βολὴ ὀφθαλμοῦ* (line 12), and this is

3) Hobein is wrong in ascribing R to the 11th cent. For the date of R see P. Louis, *Albinos Epitome, "Les belles Lettres" Paris, 1945*, p. XXIII (the cod. is referred to as *Parisinus Gr. 1962*). H. Alline dates the cod. c. 888, see P. Louis *ib.*, p. XXV note 55.

4) Hobein's stemma is to be found in *op. cit.* p. LXVIII.

5) H. Mutschmann, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte des Maximus Tyrius, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* vol. 68 (1913) pp. 560–583. His stemma *ib.* p. 583.

6) F. Schulte, *De Maximi Tyrii codicibus, Dissertatio inauguralis, Göttingae, 1915*, pp. 1–76. His stemma *ib.* p. 73.

obviously the meaning of the text here. But neither *περιβολή* nor *παραβολή* can convey the idea of *direct and rapid* *βολή*, ἀθρόως σπῶσα τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ δρωμένου. The prepositions *περί* and *παρά* are not at all apt for giving either the *rapidity* or the *directness* of the *ἐφορῶν*. The answer is clearly suggested on p. 474, 11–p. 475, 3. Maximus again describes the *θεῖος νοῦς* as ἐπὶ πάσας ἐξικνούμενος φύσεις ἀμηχάνῳ τάχει, ὡς προσβολή ὄψεως (= ὀφθαλμῶν) ... καθάπερ καὶ αἱ παρ' ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες προσπεσοῦσαι τῇ γῆ ... The first observation to make is that in the participle *προσπεσοῦσαι*, the *directness* of the sunlight is expressed with the preposition *πρός*, not *περί* or *παρά*. Note secondly the expression *προσβολή ὄψεως* (*ὄψεως* i.e. *ὀφθαλμῶν*), which again on account of *πρός* indicates the *directness* of eyesight. The *apparatus criticus* (p. 475, 2) shows that cod. N reads *περιβολή*, which is doubtless a corruption of *προσβολή*. On account of the expression *προσβολή ὄψεως* (which by corruption became *παραβολή ὄψεως* in N) on p. 475, 2, I suggest correcting *περιβολήν* (or *παραβολήν*) τοῦ ἡλίου on p. 139, 15 to *προσβολήν τοῦ ἡλίου*. The *θεῖος νοῦς* is likened to the light of the sun, which reaches the earth *instantaneously* and *directly*, while the *νοῦς ἀνθρώπου* is compared to the *slow* motion of the sun in the sky. The expression *προσβολή τοῦ ἡλίου* (i.e. *προσβάλλει ὁ ἥλιος*) is parallel to *προσβολή ὀφθαλμοῦ* (i.e. *προσβάλλει ὁ ὀφθαλμός*), and the genitive *ἡλίου* (as well as *ὀφθαλμοῦ* in the expression *προσβολή ὀφθαλμοῦ*) is a subjective genitive. For the *προσβολή τοῦ ἡλίου* cf. also p. 65, 15 ff *δέχεσθαι τὴν προσβολήν τοῦ φωτός*, ... and add Ael. N.A. 14. 23 τοῦ ἡλίου αἱ προσβολαί; Antiph. (*Vorsokr.* II 343. 27) *προσβολή ἡλίου*.

p. 190, 17ff: ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐρανὸς περιφερόμενος· καὶ γῆ τρέφουσα, καὶ ποταμοὶ ῥέοντες, καὶ δεχομένη θάλαττα, καὶ ὄραι ἀμείβουσαι, καὶ Μοῖραι διαλαγχάνουσαι, καὶ Μοῦσαι ἄδουσαι.

Markland rightly detected that *δεχομένη* was a corruption; for we must expect an object with *δεχομένη* but, as the text stands, the only possibility is *ποταμοὺς ῥέοντας*, understood from the preceding, and such a construction does not seem possible, since the signifiers of the *ἔργα Διός* (line 16 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σχολῆν ἄγει), joined by seven coordinate *καί*'s, certainly depict independent, *self-contained* pictures. Markland corrected *δεχομένη θάλαττα* to *διαχεομένη θάλαττα*. But, to my knowledge there is not a single passage in the text of Maximus where *θάλαττα* is connected either with *διαχέομαι* or with *διάχυσις*. I propose the emendation *ἀναχομένη θάλαττα*, in support of which I cite the following in-

stances: pp. 308, 3 and 440, 9 ἀναχύσεις θαλάττης; p. 49, 6 ἀναχεῖται θάλαττα; p. 25, 8–10 ὁ ὠκεανὸς ... ἀναχεῖται. Moreover, I think that a comma, not a semicolon, ought to follow περιφερόμενος.

p. 205, 4ff: Νέος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὁ φιλόσοφος πραττέτω, λεγέτω, πολιτενέσθω, στρατενέσθω, ἀρχέτω. Here the question is whether θεωρία and θεωρητικὸς βίος are more important than πράξις and πρακτικὸς βίος. Maximus finds them equally important (cf. p. 204, 12 ff ὥστε καὶ σπονδᾶς ἐκατέρω σπεισάμενοι, κ.τ.λ.), θεωρία because of γνῶσις, πράξις because of ἀρετή. But in life, he tells us, we can prefer now θεωρία now πράξις, depending on the φύσις (a special natural gift), or the ἡλικία (age), or the τύχη (attending circumstances) of the individual. Some persons are weak in πράξις but strong in θεωρία, in others the converse occurs. In this case we ought to prefer that in which we find ourselves stronger. We can also choose on the basis of age. Maximus asserts that πράξις benefits youth, adducing Homer, who says that a young man is good for all kinds of πράξεις, and, in concluding the chapter, he says: νέος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὁ φιλόσοφος πραττέτω, λεγέτω, πολιτενέσθω, στρατενέσθω, ἀρχέτω and offers as examples the cases of Plato and Xenophon. Plato's youth was occupied in ἐπι Σικελίαν δρόμοι καὶ πόνοι καὶ περὶ Δίωνα σπονδή, his old age in βαθεῖα σχολή, καὶ λόγοι καλοί, καὶ θεωρία ἄπταιστος. Xenophon too as a young man distinguished himself ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις and only as an old man ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. In these examples there is a clear distinction between λόγοι and πράξις – ἔργα. Therefore I suspect that on p. 205, 4 there is something wrong with the imperative λεγέτω. The φιλόσοφος, when young, is supposed to act (πράττειν), and to act may well mean πολιτενέσθαι, στρατενέσθαι, ἀρχεῖν, but not λέγειν, if we take into consideration the examples of Plato and Xenophon, who applied themselves to λόγοι only when old. Thus I am inclined to emend ... πραττέτω, <μη> λεγέτω ... I suspect that the μή of λεγέτω was omitted because none of the other four imperatives was negatived. The person who left out μή, not realizing the difference between πράττειν and λέγειν, πράξις and λόγοι, took λεγέτω as a kind of πράξις together with πολιτενέσθω, στρατενέσθω, ἀρχέτω. The meaning will be: When the philosopher is young, let him be active in πράξις and not in λόγοι, let him participate in politics, let him take the field as a soldier, let him rule. The πραττέτω μή λεγέτω is to be taken as one unity of which the three following imperatives constitute a tripartite epexegetis.

p. 206, 1-3: *καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περαιουῦνται στόλοι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνησιν τέχνας, ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς Θήβαισιν θυμούς, ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἀργεὶ τόπους.* Davis' emendation *καὶ τῆς* for *καὶ τῆς* is attractive but not necessary. The locative *Θήβαισιν* offered by cod. R and adopted by Hobein seems wrong. Since on p. 218, 3 we find the correct *Θήβησιν* given by R and other codd. (all the codd.?) we ought to emend *Θήβαισιν* on p. 206, 2 to *Θήβησιν* (cf. *ib.* Ἀθήνησιν and not Ἀθήναισιν). The word *θυμούς* of line 3 has rightly offended the critics. Cod. N in the margin gives *θιάσους* for *θυμούς* (this cod. misspelling *θυμούς* gives *θιμούς* which inspired the emendation to *θιάσους*); *μύθους* is conjectured by Scaliger and approved by Markland, *πύργους* by Meiser. In my judgment, none of the proposed emendations restores the original text. On three occasions Maximus has stated that the Thebans are known for their *αὐλοὶ* and *αὐλητικὴ* a) p. 208, 20ff *Θηβαῖοι αὐλητικὴν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἢ δι' αὐλῶν μούσα ἐπιχώριος τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς· Ἀθηναῖοι λέγειν, καὶ ἔστιν ἢ περὶ λόγους σπουδὴ τέχνη Ἀττικῆ· παιδεύματα Κρητικὰ θῆρα ... τὰ Θετταλικά ἑπικὴ, τὰ Κυρηναϊκὰ διφρεῖαι, τὰ Αἰτωλικά ληστεῖαι. ἀκοντίζουσιν Ἀκαρῶνες, πελτάζουσιν Θορᾶκες, νησιῶται πλέουσιν.* b) p. 338, 7ff Ὁ μὲν Κροτωνιάτης ἐρᾷ κοτίνου Ὀλυμπικῆς, ὁ δὲ Ἀθηναῖος νίκης τριηρικῆς, ὁ δὲ Σπαρτιάτης ὀπλιτικῆς, ὁ Κρητικὸς θήρας, ὁ Συβαρῆτης χλιδῆς, ὁ Θηβαῖος αὐλῶν, ὁ Ἴων χορῶν κ.τ.λ. c) p. 432, 13ff *Ὅττω Βοιωτὸς τοὺς ἀγροίκους αὐλὸς ἐπιτηδευόμενος ἡμέρωσεν, καὶ ποιητῆς Πίνδαρος συνωδὸς τῷ αὐλῷ.* On p. 205, 18-206, 3 Maximus refers first to the European tourist who goes to Egypt to see the Nile, the pyramids, or strange animals, or who goes to the Istros, or the Ganges, or Babylon, or Sardis, or Ilion, or the Hellespont, attracted by this or that tourist attraction. Then he refers to the inhabitant of Asia who comes as a tourist to Athens, Thebes, or Argos, to view the special attractions offered by these cities to their visitors. If in the aforementioned passages Maximus speaks of the flutes as the distinguishing characteristic of Theban culture, it is but natural to suppose that Maximus will make his Asiatic tourists go to Thebes to hear the Thebans play the flute. I think that we ought to emend *ΘΥΜΟΥΣ* on p. 206, 3 to *ΑΥΛΟΥΣ* (*αὐλούς*).

p. 206, 14ff ... *πᾶσαν μὲν περαιουμένην θάλατταν, πᾶσαν δὲ διερχομένην γῆν, πάντα δὲ ἄερα ἀνιπταμένην, συνθέουσα ἡλίῳ, συμπεριφερομένη σελήνῃ, συνδεδεμένη τῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων χορῷ, καὶ μονονοχὴ τῷ Διὶ συνοικονομοῦσα τὰ θντα καὶ συντάττουσα.* This is the text offered by our codices. In the present passage Maximus tells

us that the philosopher's soul crosses not only every land and sea but also the regions of heaven since it runs together with the sun, moves together with the moon, and dances together with the other stars. The first observation to make is that the *μέν ... δέ ... δέ* of the text shows that the three regions of the soul's activities are *πᾶσα θάλαττα ... πᾶσα γῆ ... πᾶς ἀήρ*. What follows after *πάντα δὲ ἀέρα ἀνιπταμένη*, namely, *συνθέουσα ἡλίῳ ... συμπεριφερομένη σελήρῃ, συνδεδεμένη τῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον χορῶν* has no *δέ* and seems to be a further elaboration of *ἀέρα ἀνιπταμένη*. But the sun, the moon, the stars, and the soul running with them are found not in the region of *ἀήρ* but either in the region of *αἰθήρ* or beyond it. The following passages of Maximus illustrate this: p. 107, 14ff *τοῦτο δύναται καὶ γῆ πρὸς αἰθέρα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰρηναῖόν τι χρῆμα, καὶ παιάνων μεστὸν καὶ θείων χορῶν, ἡ δὲ πολυφωνίας καὶ πολυεργίας καὶ διαφωνίας. Ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἀπαλλαγῆ ψυχῆ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε [i.e. ἐκ γῆς εἰς αἰθέρα], ἀποδνομένη τὸ σῶμα ... ἐποπτεύει μὲν αὐτὴ τὰ οἰκεῖα θεάματα καθαροῖς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, μήτε ὑπὸ σαρκῶν ἐπιπροσθονομένη ... μήτε ὑπὸ ἀέρος θολεροῦ διατειχιζομένη, κ.τ.λ.* On p. 457, 3-10 Maximus places *αἰθήρ* below *οὐρανός* and *ἄστροα, ἀήρ* below *αἰθήρ*, and finally *θάλαττα* below *ἀήρ*. The text reads: *οὐχ ὄραξ τὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τοῦτον οὐρανόν, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄστροα, καὶ τὸν ὑπ' αὐτῷ αἰθέρα καὶ ὑπὸ τούτῳ ἀέρα, καὶ τὴν ὑπ' αὐτῷ θάλατταν*; However, Maximus does not always separate *αἰθήρ* from *οὐρανός*. On p. 107, 14ff where *αἰθήρ* is described as *παιάνων μεστὸν καὶ θείων χορῶν*, Maximus seems to be indicating with *παιάνων* and *θείων χορῶν* either the harmonious movements (cf. *χορῶν*) of celestial bodies, and thus to be taking *αἰθήρ* synonymously with *οὐρανός*, or else to be referring to the company of the gods who are found in *οὐρανός* and so again *αἰθήρ* and *οὐρανός* coincide. At any rate the flight of the soul on p. 206, 12), finds a good parallel on p. 114, 1ff, where the *πτῆσις* of the soul is explicitly stated to take place not in *ἀήρ* but in *αἰθήρ*: *... ἔοικεν μὲν ὑπνω καλῶ καὶ μεστῷ ἐναργῶν ὀνειρώτων· ἔοικεν δὲ ψυχῆς πτήσει μεταρσίῳ, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄκρων φερομένης τῶν ὄρων ἐν ἀχλωδίῳ καὶ ταραττομένῳ τῷ ἀέρι ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ὑποῦ ἐν σταθερῷ αἰθέρι ...* From these passages it becomes clear that Maximus, agreeing with the general Greek view, places *αἰθήρ* above *ἀήρ* and also makes the soul travel *ἐν αἰθέρι*. The flight of the soul in the ether is also found on p. 113, 6ff *ἡ δὲ ψυχῆ ἐκδύσα τοῦ σώματος, ἐπλανᾶτο ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι, ...* Finally its flight from earth to heaven without the intermediate stage of *ἀήρ* but directly from earth to the ether is excellently illustrated by the

following passages: p. 440, 4ff ἔφασκεν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῷ καταλιποῦσαν τὸ σῶμα, ἀναπτᾶσαν εὐθὺ τοῦ αἰθέρος, περιπολῆσαι τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἑλλάδα κ.τ.λ. p. 106, 17ff ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀποκάμη τὰ νεῦρα ταυτί, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὡσπερ καλώδια, ἐξ ὧν τέως προσώρμιστο τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ μὲν ἐφθάρη καὶ κατὰ βυθοῦ ᾤχετο, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐκνηξαμένη συνέχει τε αὐτὴν καὶ ἴδρται. καὶ καλεῖται ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ δαιμων ἤδη, θρέμμα αἰθέριον, μετοικισθὲν ἐκ γῆς ἐκεῖ (i. e. μετοικισθὲν ἐκ γῆς εἰς αἰθέρα as it becomes clear from p. 107, 14ff τοῦτο δύναται καὶ γῆ πρὸς αἰθέρα). Notice the adjective αἰθέριον describing ψυχῆ. So I believe that on p. 206, 14ff instead of πάντα δ' ἄερα we ought to write πάντα δ' αἰθέρα. Ἄηρ for Maximus is a part of the earthly region alone and it seems strange to suppose that in this passage in particular, where he is speaking about the journey of the philosopher's soul – the αἰθέριον θρέμμα *par excellence* – he divagated from his custom and used ἄηρ in place of αἰθήρ. Reiske emended ἀνπιπταμένη το διπταμένη with the observation: διπταμένη *nam alias, si ἀνπιπταμένη servetur, leg. sit πάντα δὲ πρὸς αἰθέρα*. I find his observation convincing. If then either πρὸς or δι- were corrupt it is easy to see how the corruption would be extended to the next word. Thus αἰθέρα<sup>7)</sup> became ἄερα.

p. 215, 9ff Ἄν τοίνυν καθ' ἡδονὴν κρίνης Ὀμηρον ἄδειν ἄνδρας, εἰσκυκλείς ποιητῶν χορὸν ἀκόλαστον καὶ βακχεύοντα, κρατοῦντα ἡδονῆ τῆς Ὀμήρου ᾧδῆς, ἀποχειροτονεῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν ἄνδρα. Ἡδὺς μὲν γάρ, ἡδύς, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάλλος ἀκμαιότερον τῆς ἡδονῆς, καὶ μὴ παρέχον σχολὴν εὐφραίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐπαινεῖν ἄλλ' ἐπαινος σὺν ἡδονῇ μὲν, ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ ἡδονή. On line 10 (Schenkl) Reiske and Duebner give (ᾶ) δεινὰ δρᾶς instead of ἄδειν ἄνδρας. Markland emends to ἄδειν οἶον δρᾶς. Hobein's text, with the punctuation it bears, makes no sense as far as I can see. Duebner<sup>8)</sup> punctuates and translates as follows: Ἄν τοίνυν καθ' ἡδονὴν κρίνης Ὀμηρον, δεινὰ δρᾶς. εἰσκυκλείς ποιητῶν χορὸν ἀκόλαστον καὶ βακχεύοντα, κρατοῦντα ἡδονῆ τῆς Ὀμήρου ᾧδῆς. Ἀποχειροτονεῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν ἄνδρα; Ἡδύς μὲν γάρ, ἡδύς, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάλλος ἀκμαιότερον τῆς ἡδονῆς, καὶ μὴ παρέχον σχολὴν εὐφραίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐπαινεῖν ἄλλ' ἐπαινος σὺν ἡδονῇ μὲν, ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ ἡδονή. 'Quodsi Homerum ex volupt-

7) The distinction between αἰθήρ and ἄηρ, the first connected with the soul, the second with the body appears also in p. 81, 14ff.

8) *Theophrasti Characteres, ... Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes graece et latine cum indicibus ... emendavit Fred. Duebner, Parisiis, A. Firmin-Didot, 1877, p. 94. lines 37-44.*

tate aestimas, rem atrocem facis: examen ingens lascivorum nobis furiosorumque immittis poetarum, qui in hac quidem parte Homero sunt praeferendi. Tunc suffragio tuo iucunditatem Homero non concedis? Iucundus, fateor, iucundus est; sed longe maior eius pulchritudo, quae lectori non permittit ut delectetur, sed ut laudet tantum: laus autem ut cum voluptate coniuncta est, ita non est ipsa voluptas'. As we shall see, this interpretation is not satisfactory either. In his *apparatus criticus* Hobein stated that Knebel defended the reading of the codd. I do not know whether Knebel's defence pertains to lines 11-16 as well. I was unable to find his publication (*Observationes in Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes, Progr. Gymnas. Coblenz I et II 1833*; see Hobein's edition, *praef.* p. XVIII), and so cannot say to what extent our opinions coincide.

The question which Maximus raises in the present speech is whether Plato is justified in dismissing Homer from the ideal city. Maximus answers the question in a way expected to satisfy both the Platonist and the admirer of Homer. The fact that Homer was driven out of the ideal city, Maximus tells us on p. 211, ought not to be interpreted as an *ἀτιμία*. Plato's city is not a Cretan, a Dorian, a Peloponnesian, a Sicilian, or an Attic city with real existence, but an imaginary city or, more exactly, an ideal city. In this ideal city both *ξυνοίκησις* και *πολιτεία* are made by *λόγος* (while in an actual city they are made by *χρεία*). In other words Plato's *πολιτεία* is conceived as *βίος θεωρητικός* and not as *βίος πρακτικός*. Had Plato concerned himself with the problems of an actual city he would certainly have retained not only Homer but also other poets as a kind of *φάρμακον*, for what he styles *ταπεινὸν και ἡμελημένον* (p. 213, 17-18; also see ib. 2-17). But *ὅπόθεν ἐξελήλαται τὸ ταπεινὸν πᾶν και τὸ ἡμελημένον, τί δεῖ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτου φαρμάκου*; The answer is *οὐδὲν δεῖ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτου φαρμάκου*. We cannot but agree that such a *φάρμακον* is not needed in the ideal Platonic city. To make his point clearer Maximus gives a hypothetical example (p. 212, 1 ff). Suppose there were a human society of which each member possessed a body absolutely *ἀδεὲς φαρμάκων και μαγγανευμάτων και διατηρημάτων ἰατρικῶν*. Is it possible to imagine that these people would consider it a dishonor to the god and the art of medicine to have sent Hippocrates the physician out of their city to other societies in which sickness still exists? It is the sick who need the physician, not the healthy. After this example Maximus returns to the original question *εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὁμηρον τῆς πολιτείας παρητήσατο*.



Homer, he tells us, has been considered a great poet on account of *χρεία* and *ἡδονή*. The meaning of *χρεία* can be inferred from p. 213, 10–13. In actual human society we find what we can call *ταπεινὸν καὶ ἡμελημένον*, which we have to cure. We then use Homer who *τὰς οὐσας περὶ θεῶν δόξας ἐμμελῶς μεγαλύνει καὶ τρέφει τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχὰς ἐκ ταπεινῆς φαντασίας εἰς ἐκπληξιν* (p. 213, 9ff). This change from *ταπεινὴ φαντασία* to *ἐκπληξιν* is a necessity, a *χρεία* of an actual city, and Homer is its *φάρμακον* which produces the desirable results. Homer falls upon *ἀκοαῖς τεθραμμέναις κακῶς* (ib. line 12) and improves their moral condition. The meaning of *ἡδονή* here is easily understood. It is the *τέρψις* produced by the music of the verses and the other beauties of poetry. If we recall the axiom of Neoptolemus of Parion according to which art is a combination of *τέρπειν τε καὶ ὠφελεῖν* to please (aesthetically) and to assist (morally) we clearly understand that Maximus' *ἡδονή* stands for *τέρπειν* and his *χρεία* for *ὠφελεῖν*. Maximus will now proceed to claim that Homer's *ἡδονή* and *χρεία* can find no place in the Platonic ideal city, which is meant to be *ἄβατος ἡδονῆ ... καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν χρείαν* (p. 214, 6–9). The *χρεία* of the Platonic city *ξυνελλήλαται ... εἰς τροφὴν ἀκριβῆ καὶ ἀκουσμάτα ἀναγκαῖα, οὐδὲν αὐθαιρέτων, οὐδὲ ἀπτεξουσίων, οὐδὲ οἶον ἂν δέξαιντο παρὰ τῶν μητέρων παῖδες ὑπὸ φήμης ἀλόγου πλυσθέντα μῦθον* (p. 213, 2–6). It is clear then that the *μῦθος* of the Platonic ideal city is always *ἔλλογος* and that there are no *ἀκοαὶ τεθραμμέναι κακῶς* among the citizens which need the Homeric *φάρμακον*. Furthermore the Platonic city can exist by excluding any *ἡδονῶν γένεσιν* (p. 213, 19–214, 5). If then poetry like Homer's is something *παρασκευαστικὸν ἡδονῆς* it must be excluded on principle from the ideal city. It may be observed here that Hobbein's addition of *<ἀδελῆς>* on p. 214, 6 is unnecessary. The genitives *θεαμάτων* and *ἀκουσμάτων* depend on *ἡδονῆ* and the two *καί*'s should be translated as *both ... and*. The translation is: The city founded by Plato is inaccessible to the pleasures of both spectacles and things heard. This means that the citizens of the ideal city do not partake of *ἡδονῆ* with their eyes (*θεαμάτων*) or with their ears (*ἀκουσμάτων*).

From the preceding it becomes clear that Maximus takes the view that *καλῶς Πλάτων Ὀμηρον τῆς πολιτείας παρητήσατο*. It was, after all, to be expected that a Platonic philosopher like him would express such a view. Let us now return to our original problem on p. 215, 9–16. If we punctuate the text as Duebner did and read in translation *'laus autem ut cum voluptate coniuncta est,*

*ita non est ipsa voluptas*, we must understand Maximus as stating that what Plato considered *ἡδονή* in Homer was in reality not *ἡδονή*. This is obviously absurd, especially if we keep in mind that Maximus is at the very end of his speech and must be in agreement with his previous arguments. I think the text is sound and that the problem may be solved by the following punctuation: *ἂν τοίνυν καθ' ἡδονὴν κρίνης "Ομηρον ἄδειν ἄνδρας, εἰσκυκλεῖς ποιητῶν χορὸν ἀκόλαστον καὶ βακχεύοντα, κρατοῦντα ἡδονῆ τῆς "Ομήρου ᾠδῆς. ἀποχειροτονεῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν ἄνδρα. "ἡδύς μὲν γάρ, ἡδύς, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάλλος ἀκμαιότερον τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ μὴ παρέχον σχολὴν εὐφραίνεισθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐπαινεῖν."* ἀλλ' ἐπαινος σὺν ἡδονῆ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ ἡδονή; I take *ἄνδρας* (line 10) as meaning *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* and *ἄνδρα* (line 12) as meaning *"Ομηρον*.

As we have said, Maximus made it clear that the decision of Plato to dismiss Homer from the ideal *πολιτεία* was a matter of principle and did not follow from Plato's personal dislike of Homer. From the moment that one accepts it as a fact that Homer sings the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* and by it produces *ἡδονή* one has to remove Homer from the city which is *ἄβατος ἡδονῆ*. For then, if we retain Homer, by the same token we must permit entrance (*εἰσκυκλεῖς*) to all other poets whose poetry aims at *ἡδονή*, and who, as a matter of fact, possess more of that quality than Homer. This is logical and in agreement with what has been propounded in the speech so far. But if one wants to object to Plato's decision, one can question whether what Plato called *ἡδονή* in Homer is really *ἡδονή*. Maximus introduces this objection with a main clause which almost functions as a conditional sentence: "(Suppose that) you deny the fact that Homer produces *ἡδονή* (Suppose that you say:). 'Yes, yes, I agree that Homer is *ἡδύς* but the Homeric *κάλλος* is more predominant in this poetry, and it offers leisure not for *ἡδονή* but for *ἐπαινος*.'" The objection is clearly raised against Plato and, for that reason, against the Platonic Maximus. The latter answers: "Do you talk of *ἡδονή* combined with *ἐπαινος* and because of this combination deny the existence of *ἡδονή*?" Indeed to be consistent it has to be *ἡδονή* regardless of the kind of *ἡδονή*, and since the Platonic *πολιτεία* is *ἄβατος ἡδονῆ*, it must also be *ἄβατος "Ομήρω*.

I wish to add a few comments on my punctuation and interpretation. I put "*ἡδύς μὲν γάρ, ἡδύς, ... ἀλλὰ ἐπαινεῖν*" in quotation marks, because I believe that here, as in other cases, Maximus inserts an imaginary person talking in the first person, cf. p. 63, 7-9, p. 174, 3-4, p. 208, 9-12, etc.

In line 15 Reiske emends *αὐτό* to *αὐτή*. Perhaps the word *αὐτό* stands for *αὐτό τοῦτο* (sc. *τὸ πρᾶγμα*) and refers back to *ἡδονή*. In such a case no emendation is necessary.

p. 264, 16 ff. Before discussing this passage, which obviously presents many problems, as we can see from Hobein's *apparatus criticus*, I wish to examine closely the meaning of p. 264, 4–16. Maximus is speaking there of the *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί*, which, having entered the sea, preserve for some time (and near the coast) their water *ἄμιγές ἄλλη φύσει πικροτέρα* (i.e. *ἄμιγές θαλαττιῶ ὕδατι*). However, as these *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί* advance further into the open sea, they inevitably mix their (sweet) water with the (salty) water of the sea, and as a result of this *ἐπιμιξία* they destroy *τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν* (the original quality) of their water. The meaning of *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί* is now clear. Maximus is referring to rivers such as the Nile, which rush into the sea with such a great mass of water that in the *πρώτη ἐκβολή* (i.e. in the sea but near the shore) their water preserves its *sweetness* and is *potable*. The important thing to be observed there is that Maximus speaks of the *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί* from the moment they entered the sea. What happens to these rivers before reaching the sea is irrelevant to the present purpose. The *ναῦται θαλάττιοι*, Maximus tells us, come near the shore and take the water of these *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί*. In so doing they do not come ashore, but take water aboard in the area of the *πρώτη ἐκβολή* of the river. This becomes clear from the text (p. 264, 4–7): *καθάπερ τῶν ποταμῶν οἱ γενναιότατοι ἐξιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν κατὰ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἐκβολὴν σώζουσιν τὸ ρεῦμα* (constantly their waters are already in the sea) *ἄμιγές ἄλλη φύσει πικροτέρα, καὶ* (i.e., and as a result of their preserving their water *ἄμιγές*) *τοῖς ναύταις θαλαττίοις προσπλεύσασιν ἀκραιφνές ποτόν* (sc. *σώζουσιν*). Exactly parallel to the example of the *γενναιότατοι ποταμοί* is the example of the *ἄροητον καὶ ἀθάνατον κάλλος* (264, 11–16). This *κάλλος* is first seen when it enters *οὐρανός* and the *οὐράνια σώματα* (cf. *εἰσπεσὼν ἐκεῖ* line 13, which is parallel to *πρώτη ἐκβολή* of line 5). In this initial state the *ἄροητον καὶ ἀθάνατον κάλλος* remains *ἀκραιφνές, ἄμιγές, and ὀλόκληρον* (exactly as the *ρεῦμα* of a *γενναιότατος ποταμός* in its *πρώτη ἐκβολή*). But when this *κάλλος* comes *εἰς τὸν δεῦρο τόπον* (i.e. in this world) *ἀμβλύνεται καὶ ἀμαυροῦται* (i.e., it loses its *ἀρχαία φύσις*, as the *γενναιότατος ποταμός* does *εἰσπεσὼν εἰς πέλαγος πλατύ* line 8–9).

At this point Maximus returns to the example of the *θαλάττιος ναύτης* (line 16). He speaks of the *ἀμυγές ρεῦμα γενναιοτάτου ποταμοῦ*, but at the same time he refers to the *ἄρρητον καὶ ἀθάνατον κάλλος*, and thus on p. 265, 1–2 the *ναύτης* is not thirsty but *σκιεῖται καὶ φλογοῦται καὶ φαιδρύνεται καὶ ἐρᾷ*. Maximus, however, clearly refers to the *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός* and to the *φύσις* of its water which the *ναύτης θαλάττιος* remembers, having drunk it during the *πρώτη ἐκβολή* when it was still sweet. But, as we have seen, the *φύσις* of the *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός* before it reaches the sea is *irrelevant* to the present example. Furthermore, the water of such a *ποταμός* loses its *ἀρχαία φύσις* only after passing beyond the *πρώτη ἐκβολή*. What then can be the meaning of lines 18–19 *ὄρων* (sc. *ὁ θαλάττιος ναύτης*) *αὐτήν (τήν τοῦ γενναιοτάτου ποταμοῦ φύσιν) ἀμυδρὰν ἐν γῆ πλανωμένην καὶ ἀνακεκραμένην ἄλλοτρία φύσει?* If the *φύσις* of the *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός* is *still πλανωμένη ἐν γῆ*, it *cannot* have been mixed *ἄλλοτρία φύσει*, which simply means “with salty sea water”, in accordance with what we read in line 6. One might argue that the *ἐν γῆ πλανωμένην* could refer to *κάλλος*, but in this case I cannot see why Maximus has introduced the example of the *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός*, the waters of which lose their *ἀρχαία φύσις* only far out at sea. He could have said simply that the waters of the river (any river, not specifically the *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός*) become dirty as they enter any muddy area, etc. What was the reason for inserting the specific example of *γενναιοτάτος ποταμός*? Thus, unless Maximus is “*neglegentissimus omnium scriptorum*”, I think we should emend *ἐν γῆ* (line 19) to *ἐν πελάγει*.

Notice that on p. 264, 8 ff the *γενναιοτάτοι ποταμοί* corrupted the *ἀρχαία φύσις* of their water *προελθόντες πόρρω* (sc. *ἐν θαλάττῃ*) *καὶ εἰσπεσόντες εἰς πέλαγος πλατὺ καὶ παραδόντες τὸ ρεῦμα ἀνέμοις καὶ κύμασιν καὶ ζάλῃ*, which makes it certain that the *πλάνη* (cf. line 19 *πλανωμένην*) takes place only *ἐν πελάγει*. The emendation *ἐν <πελάγει* gives, I think, excellent sense. We have already seen that Maximus, resuming the example of the *θαλάττιος ναύτης*, blends the *ρεῦμα γενναιοτάτου ποταμοῦ* with the *κάλλος ἀθάνατον*, and thus the *ναύτης* is presented not as *διψῶν* but as *ἐρῶν*. However, this blending is quite logical on the basis of the parallel stages of: A) *πρώτη ἐκβολή γενναιοτάτου ποταμοῦ* (whence the *ναύτης* takes water and “remembers” its quality), corresponding to the *πρώτη ἐκβολή* of *κάλλος ἀθάνατον* in heaven and the celestial bodies (whence the *ψυχή* gets acquainted with it and remembers it); B) *ἀφάνισις τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως τῶν ὑδάτων γενναιοτάτου ποτα-*

μοῦ as they reach πέλαγος πλατύ and they mingle with the sea through the intervention of ἄνεμοι, κύματα, ζάλη, κλύδων, corresponding to the ἄμβλωνσις and ἀμαύρωσις of the ἀθάνατον κάλλος as it reaches the δεῦρο τόπος (i. e. δεῦρο βίος). This becomes all the more likely if we remember that Maximus, speaking of life on earth, constantly compares it with πέλαγος (πλατύ), e. g. p. 166, 9ff: τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, οὐχ ἔδραϊον ... ἀλλὰ νεὼς ὀκιάδος, ἐν πελάγει πλατεῖ etc.; p. 352, 6ff ἀνθρώπων δόξαι καὶ παθήματα ... χρῆμα οὐ στενόν, ... ἀλλ' ... πέλαγος πλατύ, etc.; p. 142, 8ff καταπεσοῦσα γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν θόρυβον, καὶ δοῦσα ἑαυτὴν ἐπ' ἀμηγάνου φορεῖσθαι κύματος, νήχεται δυσέκνευστον πέλαγος ... Thus, while the ἀμαύρωσις κάλλους in the δεῦρο τόπος can be compared with the destruction of the water of the γενναϊότατος ποταμὸς in the πλατὺ πέλαγος (and this because Maximus frequently speaks of human life as a πέλαγος πλατύ), it is impossible to speak of the ἀμαύρωσις ὑδάτων γενναϊότατου ποταμοῦ before it passes beyond the πρώτη ἐκβολή, for such ἀμαύρωσις or νοθεία or μίξις can take place only in the open sea, if the example of the γενναϊότατοι ποταμοὶ is to have any point in the present speech. Hobein's addition of <πλήν> before ναύτης θαλάττιος (line 17) is to my mind unnecessary. The question is not whether other men (such as carpenters, smiths, or poets, etc.) would recognize the existence of the water of a γενναϊότατος ποταμὸς mingled with sea-water, but simply whether the θαλάττιος ναύτης would recognize it by means of his ἀνάμνησις of the quality of the water in the πρώτη ἐκβολή.

p. 280, 7ff ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος (ὃς σοῦ δῆριον ἐπαινέτου δεήσεται ὁ γὰρ Ἀπόλλων φθάνει λέγων πρὸς αὐτόν [*Oracul. ap. Herodot. I 65*] δίζω, ἢ σε θεὸν μαντεύομαι, ἢ ἄνθρωπον), ὁ τοίνυν Λυκοῦργος οὗτος, ὃν ὁ θεὸς εἰκάζει θεῶ, κ.τ.λ. Codd. RM give ὄσον, Na (followed by Heinse, Davis, Dukas and Duebner) give οὐ σοῦ, Schenkl deletes ὃς (as a product of dittography: Λυκοῦργος [ος]), and Hobein changes to ὃς σοῦ "ironic", but I do not think that such irony has any place here, where Apollo declares Lycurgus "equal to god" (line 11). The emendation ὃς σοῦ under these circumstances is not "ironical" but "sarcastic". Whom, however, does Maximus address in this manner and why? There is no σύ (or σοῦ) in the text up to this point that shows arrogance that might be met with such bitterness. The easiest correction is suggested by the ὄσον of RM, viz. ὃς οὐ. I propose: ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος, ὃς οὐ δῆριον ἐπαινέτου δεήσεται, ὁ γὰρ Ἀπόλλων φθάνει λέγων πρὸς αὐτόν δίζω ἢ σε

θεὸν μαυτεύομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ὁ τοίνυν Λυκούργος οὗτος, δὲν ὁ θεὸς εἰκάζει θεῶν κ.τ.λ. The meaning is: But Lycurgus, who, I suppose, shall stand in need of no eulogist, since Apollo in anticipation says to him, "I am in doubt whether I should address you as a god or a man", – this Lycurgus, as I was saying (*τοίνυν*), whom the god (Apollo) compares to a god, etc. The meaning is obvious. If Apollo has compared Lycurgus to a god, Lycurgus does not stand in need of any human eulogist in the future (*δεήσεται*). The usage of οὐ δήπου here is quite parallel with οὐ δήπου on p. 21, 7. In both passages *δήπου* is not ironical but simply means "I suppose".

On line 13, following Markland, Reiske (Dukas), I think we should write *κατεστήσατο*. Also on p. 281, 2–3 I think we should emend with Reiske and Meiser *προμαχεῖν* to *προμαχεῖ* and *σώζειν* to *σώζει*.

p. 332, 8–9: The codd. (with the exception of *φα*) give: ... *καὶ πρὸ τῆς διαίτης αὐτὸς τρόπος*; Instead of *πρὸ φα* give *ποιός* and this is accepted as the correct reading by Heinse, Dukas, and Duebner. Schenkl emends *πρὸ* to *προσέτι*. Hobein writes *πρὸ* without any attempt to explain its meaning. Furthermore *φα* give *αὐτῆς* instead of *αὐτός*, a reading followed by Heinse, Davis, Dukas and Duebner, while Davis<sup>2</sup>, followed by Schenkl, conjectures *αὐ τις* for *αὐτῆς* and inserts *ὁ* in front of *τρόπος*, which is also given by cod. C. Following the reading of our best cod. R, I suggest ... *καὶ τις ὁ τῆς διαίτης οὗτος τρόπος* for which there is an exact parallel on p. 362, 14–15: ... *καὶ τις ὁ τῆς δοκιμασίας οὗτος τρόπος*; I have emended *πρὸ* to *τις ὁ*. The combination of T and I very frequently becomes confused with II, and a C with an excess of ink in its upper part can easily be read as P. As for the emendation of *αὐτός* to *οὗτος*, it is palaeographically very easy (one has only to write *o* for *a*), and, moreover, there is an exact parallel in the aforementioned passage on p. 362.

p. 333, 19–p. 334, 9: This passage presents many textual problems, and therefore many emendations have been proposed. We are fairly certain, however, about its general meaning. Maximus is speaking about two *ὀδύνης γένη* (cf. p. 334, 5 *ἕτερον δ' αὖ ἐστὶν ὀδύνης γένος*, which presupposes a first *ὀδύνης γένος*). The first *ὀδύνης γένος* occurs when sickness attacks the whole body simultaneously, which becomes clear from p. 334, 1 *ἀνακραθεῖσα ἐπιεικῶς ὄλω* (sc. *τῷ σώματι*). In this case sickness with "fever"

appears over the entire body. The second *ὀδύνης γένος* is a sickness (not necessarily characterized by fever), which attacks first only a part of the body and then gradually infects the whole body, as is evident from p. 334, 6ff: *ἐπειδὴν μόριον μὲν ἦ ... καὶ συννεπισπάσσηται τῇ ὀδύνῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα πᾶν*. The textual problem that I wish to attack here lies in the two conditional sentences found on p. 333, 19 and 334, 1–2: ... *εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἴσον τὸ σῶμα ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν, καὶ ἀνακραθεῖσα ἐπεικῶς ὄλω διετάραξεν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν οὐσίαν, καθάπερ σίδηρον πῦρ ...* Meiser emended *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν* to *ὑπεδύσατο*, while Reiske keeps *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν* but emends *διετάραξεν* to *διαταράξειεν*. If we assume that *καὶ* paratactically connects *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν* and *διετάραξεν*, then, for the passage to make sense, we should indeed change either *διετάραξεν* to *διαταράξειεν* with Reiske, or *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν* to *ὑπεδύσατο* with Meiser. The potential optative *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν* is offensive since Maximus does not use *εἰ* + pot. opt. We can conclude then with certainty that there must be something wrong with *ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν*. I suggest that Maximus wrote *ΥΠΟΔΥΣΑΠΑΝ* (*ὑποδύσα πᾶν*), which was corrupted to *ΥΠΟΔΥΣΑΙΤΑΝ* (*ὑποδύσαιτ' ἄν*). As is well known IT and TI and II are very frequently confused. The emendation to *ὑποδύσα πᾶν* seems to me almost certain, not only because it is justifiable palaeographically, but also because *πᾶν* taken with *ὑποδύσα* balances rhetorically *ὄλω* taken with *ἀνακραθεῖσα* (both *πᾶν* and *ὄλω* referring to *σῶμα* of p. 333, 19) and because the connection of *πᾶν* with *σῶμα* is supported by the parallel expression in the context, e.g. *ἄλλο σῶμα πᾶν* (p. 334, 9), *τὸ σῶμα πᾶν* (p. 334, 15), *τοῦτο* (i.e. *τὸ σῶμα*) *δὲ πᾶν* (p. 335, 16). Moreover, with this emendation the aorist participle *ἀνακραθεῖσα* (p. 334, 1) which follows, squares nicely with the aorist participle *ὑποδύσα* (both participles depending on *διετάραξεν*). The *καὶ* connects *ὑποδύσα* with *ἀνακραθεῖσα*. The meaning is: if (sc. the sickness of the body) has confounded the natural essence of the body exactly as fire (sc. confounds) iron (i.e. the natural essence of iron) by having entered the whole body and by having mingled well with the whole (sc. body), etc. Nothing certain can be said for the rest of the passage. Perhaps the apodosis *ἐν γένος (ὀδύνης)* has dropped out. The *ἔτερον αὖ ὀδύνης γένος* suggests it.

p. 382, 2ff: *Παρανομεῖς περὶ τοὺς θεμένους οὐδὲν σοφία καὶ ἡδονῆ κοινόν*. All the codd. have a semicolon after *θεμένους*, and this punctuation is followed by Heinse, Davis, Duebner. In line 3 R gives *σοφία*, the other codd. *φιλοσοφία* (adopted by Heinse, Davis,

Dukas, Duebner). Concerning the punctuation of the text Davis observes: *Paccius et Heinsius ita verterunt, quasi θεμελίους legerint. Ego sane potius orationem continuaverim, παρανομεῖς περὶ τοὺς θεμένους οὐδὲν φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡδονῆ κοινόν: Peccas in eos, qui nihil esse philosophiae cum voluptate commune posuerunt.* Markland defends the punctuation of the text: *παρανομεῖς περὶ τοὺς θεμένους. Scil. θεμένους τὸ ὄνομα quod praecessit: iniurius es in eos qui hoc nomen posuerunt. patet ex iis quae sequuntur. Non igitur legendum θεμελίους, neque aliter distinguendum puto. θεμένους* was emended indirectly by Davis to *θεμελίους*, and by Rohdich to *θεοῦ θεσμούς*. I agree with Hobein that in line 3 we should adopt *σοφία*, not *φιλοσοφία*. If *ἄλλος ὁ φιλήδονος* (i. e. *ὁ φιλῶν ἡδονήν*) and *ἄλλος ὁ φιλόσοφος* (i. e. *ὁ φιλῶν σοφίαν*) (p. 382, 3–4), then *οὐδὲν σοφία καὶ ἡδονῆ κοινόν* (p. 382, 3). Excellent meaning, neat expression. I doubt, nevertheless, that *περὶ τοὺς θεμένους* is the correct reading. Who are the *θέμενοι*? In what does their “authority” exist? Both the air with which Maximus speaks (*ἄφες, ἄνθρωπε, κ.τ.λ.*) and the verb *παρανομεῖς* (p. 382, 2) make me suspect that he is attacking on solid logical ground. If we suppose with Davis that *οἱ θέμενοι* are “*ei qui nihil esse philosophiae cum voluptate commune posuerunt*,” we may ask why their view should be respected any more than the opposite view, “*nihil praeter voluptatem philosophiae commune est*”. In the human world of intellectual anarchy, where *ἡδονή* is set above *ἀρετή* (cf. p. 380, 9–381, 11), on what criteria is one to say who is the *ἐννομος* and who the *ἀνομος*? If A is *ἀνομος* on the basis of B’s criteria, then also conversely. Why should we place A above B or B above A? But if we knew who the *θέμενοι* of p. 382, 2 were, we could make a decision on the basis of “authority”. If we knew, e. g., that they were *θεοί*, we could accept the validity of their view; yet Maximus says absolutely nothing as to whether they are “men” or “gods”. And yet in a way, in the argumentative “power” of his statement, he shows his belief. On the other hand, if we suppose with Markland that Maximus meant to say: “*iniurius es in eos qui hoc nomen posuerunt*”, we make things no better. An Epicurean, for example, though he may be “unjust towards those who established the word *φιλόσοφος*”, may claim that he is none the less “just” to the cause of the “real” philosophy and philosopher, and, reversing the argument, may accuse those who established the word “philosopher” as unjust to the real cause of philosophy. By what “authority” does Maximus continue, asserting that *διακρίνεται τὰ ὄνόματα, διακρίνεται τὰ ἔργα*, etc.? That the *θέμενοι* refers to the “gods” becomes clear not only from p. 383,



7, where  $\bar{\varphi}$  (i.e.  $\tau\bar{\omega}$   $\kappa\alpha\lambda\bar{\omega}$  i.e.  $\tau\bar{\omega}$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ )  $\xi\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$   $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon$   $\delta$   $Z\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$  is opposed to  $\eta\delta\omicron\eta$ , but especially from p. 388, 4ff, where Maximus makes Zeus confine  $\eta\delta\omicron\eta$  to the realm of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\varsigma$  and  $\theta\eta\eta\tau\eta$   $\pi\lambda\eta\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$  and makes  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  the product of  $\acute{\alpha}\theta\alpha\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\rho\rho\acute{o}\eta$ . We are told, that not only does god make a distinction between  $\eta\delta\omicron\eta$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  but he also placed human  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  above  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , gave  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  to  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  as its instrument, made the purpose of  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\varphi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ , and declared  $\varphi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  (not  $\eta\delta\omicron\eta$ ) as the  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ . I am inclined to believe that on p. 382, 2  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  must refer to the gods, as Rohdich suggested with his emendation  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$   $\theta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . Yet I am not satisfied with this emendation, which can not be easily explained palaeographically. I prefer to emend: ...  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$   $\langle\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\rangle$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  ... and to theorize that the ending -  $\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  of  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  was corrupted and the text read  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon$  ...  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ; then the  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon$  ... was taken as a *ditto*graphy of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and was left out. But it is also possible that we have here a lipography: The scribe's eyes skipped from the first  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  to the second  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  etc. The construction is:  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$   $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$   $\langle\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\rangle$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\theta\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$   $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  (sc.  $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$ )  $\kappa\omicron\iota\upsilon\eta\delta\acute{o}\nu$   $\sigma\omicron\varphi\iota\alpha$   $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\eta\delta\omicron\eta$ . A passage similar in construction and meaning is found on p. 390, 12ff.  $\delta\epsilon\iota\eta\acute{o}\nu$   $\gamma\epsilon$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\iota$   $\omicron\iota$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$   $\delta\iota\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\rho\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$   $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$   $\tau\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$   $\tau\eta\varsigma$   $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$   $\acute{o}\mu\iota\lambda\iota\alpha\varsigma$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\mu\iota\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon$   $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon$   $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho\omega$   $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$   $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\mu\omicron\iota$ , ...

p. 469, 5-10: This is another very obscure passage. Since all the codd. give the same text, we have before us either a very old corruption, existing already at the time of the common archetype, or a sound text; in the latter case the difficulty is merely a matter of interpretation. The text gives:  $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\omega}$   $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$   $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\upsilon$   $\tau\eta\eta$   $\iota\sigma\omicron\tau\iota\mu\iota\alpha\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\varphi\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\omega}$ .  $T\upsilon\varphi\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$   $\eta\eta$  "Ομηρος,  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'$   $\eta\eta\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon$   $\tau\eta\varsigma$   $K\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\acute{o}\pi\eta\varsigma$   $\kappa\omega\varphi\acute{o}\varsigma$   $\eta\eta$  "Αττις,  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'$   $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\eta$   $\eta\lambda\iota\omicron\upsilon$ .  $M\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\varsigma$   $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$   $\sigma\upsilon\mu\varphi\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega$  "Αττις  $\mu\eta$   $\acute{\omicron}\rho\acute{\omega}\nu$ ,  $\beta\lambda\epsilon\pi\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega$  "Ομηρος  $\mu\eta$   $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\omega}\nu$ . "Αττι  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$   $\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$   $\eta$   $K\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\acute{o}\sigma\tau\eta$ , "Ομηρον  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$   $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$   $\acute{\alpha}\varphi\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$   $\tau\eta\eta$   $\delta\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ . The thesis of the present speech is "ὅτι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ μείζον". Since both  $\acute{\omicron}\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$  and  $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\eta}$  are  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}$  and since Maximus in accordance with the thesis of the speech states  $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$   $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\upsilon$   $\tau\eta\eta$   $\iota\sigma\omicron\tau\iota\mu\iota\alpha\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\varphi\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\omega}$  (p. 469, 5), he must consider one of the two senses as  $\mu\epsilon\iota\acute{\zeta}\omicron\upsilon$   $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$  and the other as  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omicron\upsilon$ . Which is the  $\mu\epsilon\iota\acute{\zeta}\omicron\upsilon$  and which the  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ? To make a comparison between these two  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}$  Maximus turns first to the world of the blind who can hear and then to the world of the deaf who can see. The most worthy representative of the first world, Maximus finds, is Homer. But in the world of the deaf who can see he can-

not find any really worthy representative. It seems that the best he can do is to choose Atys, who at least is a king's son. Thus Atys is taken as the most distinguished representative of the world of the deaf. Now Maximus will make Atys hear but deprive him of his eyesight, and, vice versa, will make Homer deaf but able to see. What is the result? The moment Atys enters the world of the blind who can hear, his expectations as to how worthy he can be rise. Since the blind who can hear include people like Homer, Atys can hope, now that he is able to hear Calliope, to become, if not a new Homer, at least something better than his former self. On the other hand, Homer, deprived of his ability to hear, enters the world of the deaf who can see. We cannot see music and we cannot have a concept of meters through our eyes. Now then, the highest expectation that Homer can have as to what will become of him in this new world is to see himself as another Atys. Maximus seems to say: "make Atys blind but able to hear and -- why not? -- you can even make another Homer; on the other hand, make Homer deaf but able to see and the best you can hope for is to make him another Atys". This line of thought is obtained by simply putting a question mark after *διδάσκαλον*. It must be added that here Maximus makes a *μνημονικὸν ἀμάρτημα*, for it was not Atys who was deaf but another son of Croesus, whose name is not given by the ancient authors (cf. Herod. I. 34, 43, 85). For Homer as the student of Calliope cf. p. 449, 13 *ἀξιῶν* (sc. ὁ "Ὀμηρος) μαθητῆς εἶναι τῆς Καλλιόπης.

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